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This paper explores a possible effect of social capital on the relationship between 
utility and wealth. Material status sensitivity is considered in constructing the 
individual social-capital index. The incorporation of the index into the individual’s 
utility function leads to the proposition that if utility is directly increased by wealth 
but indirectly reduced by diminishing intensity and quality of sincere social 
interaction as the material-status-gape widens, there exists an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between utility and wealth. People located in the lower and upper tails of 
the wealth distribution are less content and hence more vulnerable to depression.   
 
1. Introduction 
Conventional economic theory suggests that the greater the individuals’ stocks of 
physical and human capitals the greater their income and consumption possibilities 
and hence the higher their utility levels. Thus, individuals’ utility levels can be 
expected to rise as society becomes more technologically advanced and affluent. 
However, this expectation is not compatible with the rise in the prevalence of mental 
depression and with its distribution during the last three decades. Consistently with 
Putnam’s (1995, 2000) diagnosis of the changes in communities in the United States 
and the impact of these changes on people, there may be another type of capital 
affecting individuals’ levels of utility.  
This paper refers to the individual’s combination of physical and human 
capitals as the individual’s material wealth (wealth, shortly). The paper argues that 
social capital is adversely affected by material wealth disparities and its erosion, in 
                                                 
∗ The author is indebted to Frank Neri and Simon Ville for helpful comments.   2
turn, reduces its owners’ utility level. The paper measures social capital in a manner 
that facilitates the exposition of this possible indirect effect of material wealth, hence 
the full effect of material wealth, on the individual utility.  
Consistently with Bourdieu’s (1986) definition,
1 the paper deals with the 
social capital of the individual members of the community. The use of the term is also 
compatible with Sobel’s (2002) complementary interpretation.
2 However, the set of 
benefits associated with social capital includes those that are not stemming from 
strategic (market-return-oriented) social interactions: mutual respect, trust, solidarity, 
friendship, cultural nourishment and spiritual stimulation. Hence, throughout the 
paper the term social capital stands for individual sincere social capital. The 
individual strategic social capital is taken to be a component of the individual’s 
human capital and is included in the individual’s material wealth. 
Social capital is likely to be affected by a wide range of personal 
characteristics and factors including, charisma, age, appearance, mobility, education, 
occupation, homeownership, time-preferences and value of time and also by the 
aggregate social, cultural, political and economic structures and conditions of the 
community. (Cf., Coleman, 1988; Di Passquale and Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser and 
Sacerdole,1999; Putnam, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdole, 2002). In view of the 
objective of the paper, and for simplicity, the analysis of social capital is focused on 
the effect of material-status disparities. The analysis reveals that, as long as people’s 
social interaction is sensitive to material-status disparities, the incorporation of the 
non-pecuniary returns on social capital into the utility function generates an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between utility and material wealth. The underlying rationale is 
                                                 
1 “An attribute of an individual in a social context”. (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241) 
2 An attribute describing the “circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups and 
networks to secure benefits” to an extent that “depends on the person’s connections, the strength of 
these connections, and the resources available to their connections.” (Sobel, 2002, p. 139)   3
that in addition to generating utility from private consumption of goods and financial 
security, people derive utility from sincere social interaction. However, while their 
income, consumption possibilities and financial security increase with their material 
wealth, the intensity and quality of their association are eroded by the differences in 
their levels of material wealth. Up to a critical level of material wealth the former, 
direct effect of wealth is dominant. Beyond it, the latter, indirect effect of wealth is 
dominant. 
The effect of wealth on its owner’s social capital is outlined in a greater detail 
in section 2. An index that relates the individual’s level of social capital to the 
individual’s wealth and community size is constructed in section 3. A community 
(aggregate) social-capital index is also constructed. Section 4 incorporates the 
individual social-capital index into the individual’s utility function, presents the 
inverted U-shape relationship between utility and material wealth, and identifies the 
utility-maximizing level of wealth. Section 5 indicates the possible contribution of a 
U-shaped utility-wealth relationship for explaining three phenomena—wealthy-people 
depression, wealthy people’s publicized donations, and the individually non-
optimality of wealth-equality. It also articulates the implied testable hypotheses.  
 
2. Material-status sensitivity, community size and individual social-capital  
Consider a community of N members where, for simplicity, the distribution of wealth-
share is symmetric. The wealth-share difference between any two community-
members i and j is not necessarily known to i and j initially, but is realized during 
their interaction. The community members are material-status-sensitive: each of them 
is aware of, uncomfortable with, and has an aversion toward, deviations from his level 
of material wealth. Hence, every member’s level of sincere social association with   4
any other member is responsive to their wealth-share proximity. Recalling the 
assumption that wealth-share is symmetrically distributed, the greater the difference 
between a member’s wealth-share and the mean of the wealth-share distribution the 
weaker the member’s overall level of association with the rest of the members of the 
community. In other words, an index of the i-th member’s overall intensity and 
quality of social interaction with the rest of the community-members is negatively 
related to the difference between his actual wealth-share ( i w ) and the hypothetical 
equal-wealth share (1/N). Along the positive range of the personal material-status-
disparity spectrum ( 0 / 1 > − N wi ) people are subjected to intensified tall-poppy 
syndrome. The greater the individual’s wealth-share-deviation from the equal share 
the more frequently he encounters jealousy, hatred, strategic and deceitful behaviors, 
peer-rivalry and media intrusion—emotions and actions that adversely affect the 
quality and, in turn, the intensity of his social interaction. Moreover, snobbism may be 
correlated with affluence. Thus, the greater the individual’s wealth the higher the wall 
of his castle. Along the negative range of the personal material-status-disparity 
spectrum ( 0 / 1 < − N wi ) people are subjected to intensified stigma and 
marginalization. The greater the individual’s relative poverty the stronger the stigma 
and the higher the degree of his marginalization. In addition, pride may cause a self-
imposed withdrawal from social interaction for concealing poverty and avoiding 
shame and clemency.  
An ultimate materially poor person ( 0 = i w ) may receive expressions of 
solidarity from people in a similar condition and care from some compassionate 
members of the community. In contrast, an ultimate materially rich person ( 1 = i w , a 
person controlling the entire material wealth of the community) is exposed to utmost 
expressions of hostility from the wealth-deprived N-1 members of the community.   5
Hence, an ultimate poor person’s stock of sincere social capital is likely to be larger 
than that of an ultimate rich person. 
The size of the community is already introduced through the equal wealth-
share term (1/N). Since this introduction is indirect it does not necessarily represent 
the full effect of the community size on the individual’s social association. Hence, its 
consideration  per se might render the construction of the individual social-capital 
index improper. Therefore, a possible direct effect of community size is taken into 
account. It is assumed that the intensity and quality of the individual’s social 
interaction are also affected by the number of the people with whom the individual 
actively and passively interacts. Up to an individually critical number,  i N
~
, a positive 
social agglomeration effect is dominant. Beyond  i N
~
, crowding and congestion take 
over and the diminishing overall intimacy and trust (i.e., impersonalization) 
depreciate the individual’s intensity and quality of social interaction. This individually 
optimal (and desired) community size  i N
~
 may be larger (e.g., in small rural 
communities), or smaller (e.g., in large cities), than the actual community size N.  
An individual social-capital index reflecting the aforementioned features is 
constructed in the next section. Although the individual social-capital index is 
explicitly related only to the deviations of individual’s wealth and desired 
community-size from the average wealth and actual community-size, respectively, its 
sensitivities to these deviations are affected by the individual’s other characteristics—
rate of time preference, ideology, dynamism, age, gender, appearance, education, 
occupation, marital status, family structure, etc. 
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3. Social-capital index 
We require the social capital index of person i ( i SCI ) to satisfy the following 
conditions: 
i.  0
) / 1 (
2 <
− N w d
dSCI
i
i  (monotonically decreasing in the individual’s wealth-










 (monotonically decreasing in the distance between the 
actual size and the  individually optimal size of the community),  
iii.  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( = > = i i i i w SCI w SCI  for every  1 > N   (the social capital of an 
ultimate poor person is larger than that of an ultimate rich person), 
iv.  1 0 ≤ ≤ i SCI , 
v.  1 )
~
, / 1 ( = = = i i i N N N w SCI , 
vi.  0 ) 1 ( = = N SCIi  (there is no social capital without a human company),
3 
and  
vii.  0 ) 1 , 1 ( 1 > = > = N i i SCI N w SCI  (even an ultimate rich person can have 
some social capital). 
 
We commence the construction of the individual social-capital index by 
considering a convenient specification that satisfies conditions i, ii and v:  
2 2 )
~
( ) / 1 ( 1 i i i i i N N N w SCI − − − − = μ δ        ( 1 )  
where  i δ  and  i μ  are positive scalars and indicating the marginal depreciation effects 
of the deviation of the wealth-share of member i from the equal share and the 
                                                 
3 Note that  1 = i w  when  1 = N .   7
deviation of the community size from his desired size  i N
~
, respectively. The 
magnitudes of these marginal effects depend on personal characteristics.
4  
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That is, person i neither remain in seclusion nor stay in a community whose size is 
larger than  i N N N SCI SCI
~
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SCI SCI     (4) 
and also satisfies conditions iii and iv.  
Let  i W  denote the absolute level of the individual’s material wealth and W  
the average material wealth in the community. Then 
) ( ] ) 1 [(
/ 1 1




i − − =
−
− −  and  i SCI  can be equivalently rendered as: 
                                                 
4 For instance, an energetic, young, single, performing-art graduate may be less concerned with his 
current wealth disparity and more concerned with the deviation of the community size from his desired 

























































SCI     (5) 
 
for every community with  i N N N SCI SCI N
~




⎡ − − + − < < . 
  
Though it is not an essential part of the paper, a community (aggregate) social-
capital index (CSCI) is proposed. A meaningful CSCI is equally responsive to, and 
increasing in, the community-members’ individual social-capital levels, but 
decreasing in their variation. We therefore based the construction of CSCI on the 
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We require CSCI: 
i.  to rise monotonously with  SCI E , 
ii.  to decline monotonously with  SCI G , and  
iii.  to lie within the (0,1) interval.   9
So long that  0 > SCI G , these conditions are satisfied by  ) / exp( 1 SCI SCI G E − − . 
Recalling equations (6) and (7), our proposed index of the community social capital 
is:  
} / ] ) )( / 1 1 ( 2 exp{[ / 1 1
11 1









i SCI SCI SCI N CSCI .     (8)           
 
4. Inverted U-shaped utility-wealth relationship   
We assume that the individual’s utility is derived from the return on his portfolio of 
assets—material wealth and social capital. The return on material wealth indicates the 
individual’s consumption and saving possibilities. The return on the individual’s 
social capital is equal to the individual’s monetary appreciation of (and maximum 
willingness to pay for) the level of mutual respect, trust, solidarity, friendship, cultural 
nourishment and spiritual stimulation received from his community. Let  w r  and  s r  
denote the rates of return on material wealth and social capital, respectively. While 
w r  is market determined,  s r  is individualistic and reflecting the effects of personal 
characteristics (e.g., charisma, age, gender, appearance, education, mental disposition, 
social awareness, ideology, dynamism, ethnicity, nativity, and family structure) and 
community characteristics (e.g., dominant doctrine, age structure, educational 
structure and ethnic-native composition) excluded from the construction of the SCI. 
The synthesis of these personal characteristics and community characteristics affects 
the individual’s ability to appreciate and extract the aforementioned social benefits.  
Recalling Eq. (5), the total return on the individual’s portfolio of material and 
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= φ                                  (10)  
and is, by construction, positive. Eq. (9) reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the return on the individual’s portfolio and the individual’s material wealth. 
Assuming that the individual’s utility ( i u ) is increasing and concave in  i R  (i.e., 
0 ) ( > ′ i i R u  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ i i R u ), there also exists an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between utility and material wealth. As displayed by Figure 1, this inverted U-shaped 
relationship reveals that becoming more affluent does not necessarily imply a higher 
level of satisfaction. By virtue of the necessary condition,  0 ) ( )) ( (
* * = ′ ′ i i i i i W R W R u , the 



















































W W .                             (11)  
 
The individual’s utility-maximizing material wealth is larger than the average wealth 
in his community. The preferred extra material wealth is positively related to the ratio 
of the rates of return on material wealth and social capital. The novelty is that the 
effect of this ratio is compounded by the average material wealth in the community, 
by the actual size of the community, by the individual’s desired size of community, 
and by the level of social capital associated with potentially becoming the ultimate   11
rich person. Up to 
*
i W , material wealth complements social capital in generating 
utility. Beyond 
*
i W , the negative indirect marginal effect of material wealth on utility 
(through the erosion of social capital) exceeds its positive direct marginal effect. 
 
           Figure 1. An inverted U-shaped utility-wealth relationship  
 
The construction and analysis of the individual’s optimal portfolio of material 
wealth and social capital can be extended to the case where the rates of return on these 
assets are random. Suppose that the individual’s utility is  R e u β − − =1  (with the 
positive scalar β  indicating the individual’s degree of absolute risk aversion) and  w r  
and  s r  are normally distributed with means  s w μ μ , , variances  2 2, s w σ σ  and 
covariance  ws σ . Then, maximizing  )) ( ( R u E  is equivalent to maximizing 
) 2 ( 5 . 0
2 2 2 2 SCI WSCI W SCI W s ws w s w σ σ σ β μ μ + + − + . The construction of the 
optimal portfolio for an expected-utility-maximizer along these lines implies that 
investment in social capital is relatively large (small) in communities in which the 
Utility 
0                                       W*                                   W N     Wealth   
     max u  
       u ~    12
mean of the rate of return on social capital (material wealth) is relatively large, the 
variance of the rate of return on social capital (material wealth) is small and the 




By focusing on the role of material wealth and assuming that sincere social interaction 
between any two individuals is adversely affected by their material-status differential, 
the paper constructs an index of individual social capital. By incorporating the return 
on individual social capital into the individual’s utility function, an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between utility and material wealth emerges. This inverted U-shaped 
relationship may provide some explanation to three phenomena and implies several 
testable hypotheses. 
A notable phenomenon is a prevalent, neither accidentally nor genetically 
caused, depression within the group of wealthy people. It can be argued that when the 
individual’s utility level is lower than a mentally accommodating threshold (say u ~) 
the individual is discontent. In the case of wealthy people in particular, a low level of 
utility is due to a low frequency and quality of sincere social interaction. A prolonged 
discontent might lead to depression. As implied by the inverted U-shaped curve in 
Figure 1, people located in the lower and upper tails of the material-wealth spectrum 
are vulnerable to depression. The closer they are to the extremities of the poverty-
affluence spectrum the higher the likelihood and intensity of their depression. An 
implied testable hypothesis is that depression is more prevalent within the group of 
people in the lower and upper tails of the material-wealth spectrum.   13
Another well-known phenomenon is non-anonymous, rather heavily 
publicized, donations of large shares of wealth to public projects. In contrast, true 
philanthropy is anonymous. An inverted U-shaped relationship between utility and 
material wealth implies that even a non-philanthropist i endowed with wealth 
* W Wi >  can increase his utility by restructuring his portfolio of material and social 
assets. Recalling the individual social-capital-index equation (5), a non-anonymous 
donation is a wealthy person’s investment in his (and in his family’s) social capital. 
His optimal donation is his futile, harmful, excessive material wealth: 
* W Wi − . In 
this respect Eq. (11) suggests the following testable hypotheses. The size of the 
donation decreases with the rate of return on material capital. Moreover, the larger the 
average material wealth and size of the community the greater the donation-
moderating effect.  
An ego complex of being above the average, but not provokingly so (i.e., not a 
tall-poppy), is also a notable phenomenon. Although the individual’s social capital is 
eroded by material-wealth-disparities, the inverted U-shaped relationship reveals that 
wealth-equality is not desired by utility-maximizing people. Yet, the lower the ratio of 
the rate of return on material wealth to the rate of return on social capital the smaller 
the gape between the utility-maximizing wealth, 
*
i W , and the equal, social-capital-
maximizing wealth, W . It is likely that this ratio is lower for a member (endowed 
with adequately matching characteristics) of a traditional, religious community than 
for a person (endowed with adequately matching characteristics) living in a modern, 
secular society. This, in turn, implies (if all people are utility-maximizers and suitable 
members of their communities) the following testable hypothesis: the degree of   14
material-wealth-inequality in traditional, religious communities is lower than in 
modern, secular ones.  
Finally, the discrepancy indicated in the opening paragraph between the 
conventional economic theory proposition on the relationship between utility and 
wealth and the rise of depression in technologically advanced and materially affluent 
communities can be resolved by including sincere social capital in the definition of 
wealth.   15
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